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SENTENCING IN ENGLAND
D.A. THOMAS*
The criminal justice systems of England and the United States
trace their origins to a common legal tradition, and thus share many
common features, such as the law of evidence, the jury, and much of
the substantive law. Fundamental differences exist in post-trial proce-
dures, however, particularly in relation to the sentencing of convicted
offenders. The reasons for these differences are not hard to find. The
American jurisdictions have borrowed most heavily from England in
those areas of the criminal process where the framework was estab-
lished in England before the late eighteenth century, but the structure
of the modem English sentencing system did not begin to emerge until
the mid-nineteenth century, long after the United States was estab-
lished and the development of a distinct American legal tradition was
under way. Despite the independent development of the modern sys-
tems of sentencing in the two countries, many of the issues which have
been the subject of active debate in the United States during the last
decade have interested English judges and legislators over a longer pe-
riod. The English experience in dealing with the problems of sentenc-
ing therefore should be of value to Americans concerned with shaping
the future of sentencing in the United States, both in providing exam-
ples of institutions or procedures that might be adapted to the Ameri-
can context, and in affording warnings of dead ends that may be
avoided.
An understanding of the sentencing process in England requires
an awareness of some of the distinctive features of the context in which
it operates - especially where that context differs significantly from
that of the typical American jurisdiction. The first section of this paper
accordingly offers an account of four features of the English criminal
justice system which are distinctively different: the existence of two
modes of trial and the heavy dependence on lay magistrates, the strict
limitation on plea negotiation, the central role of appellate review of
sentences, and the limited scope of parole. The second section outlines
the historical development of the English sentencing system from the
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point at which the two systems diverged, and then describes the legal
framework of sentencing today in relation to the practical operation of
the sentencing system and the overriding concern to limit the growth of
the prison population. A final section offers a brief appraisal of the
English experience, with a view to identifying the lessons that may be
learned and the pitfalls that may be avoided.
I. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
A. Mode of Trial
The English criminal justice system provides two modes of trial:
summary trial before a magistrates' court and trial on indictment
before the Crown Court. The differences between the two forms are
considerable. In the magistrates' court, the determination of guilt and
sentence is by a bench of magistrates, who in the vast majority of cases
are lay persons without formal legal training or professional qualifica-
tion, sitting without a jury. In the Crown Court, trial is always by a
judge and, unless there is a plea of guilty, jury; there is no bench trial in
the Crown Court.
The powers of the Crown Court and the magistrates' court in rela-
tion to the various forms of sentence are substantially the same, again
with a few exceptions, but magistrates are generally limited in the
amount of the penalty they may impose, whether in terms of imprison-
ment or money. A magistrates' court may not impose more than six
months' imprisonment for a single offence or an aggregate of twelve
months for a series of offences,' except in a few unusual situations
(such as when the magistrates' court activates an existing suspended
sentence).2 Fines are limited to £1,000 for any one offence, 3 and similar
limitations apply to compensation,4 although there is no limit to the
aggregate of fines which magistrates may impose for multiple offences.
The Crown Court may impose generally higher sentences of imprison-
ment,5 and it is unlimited as to amount when imposing fines and com-
pensation orders.6 In practice, it is probable that for the same offence
the sentence imposed by a magistrates' court will usually be substan-
1. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, §§ 31(1), 133.
2. This is the effect of R. v. Lamb, 52 Cr. App. R. 667, (1968), decided on different
provisions.
3. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, § 32(1), (9).
4. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, § 40(l).
5. The maximum terms of imprisonment which may be imposed in the Crown Court
are fixed by the statute that creates the offence concerned. For a list of the maximum terms
applicable to most offences triable in the Crown Court, see ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE
PENAL SYSTEM, SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT app. A (1978).
6. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 30(1) and Criminal Law Act 1977, § 32(1).
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tially lower than that imposed by the Crown Court, although this asser-
tion is impossible to document.
The judges who impose sentence in the Crown Court have varying
degrees of experience.7 The most serious cases are dealt with by High
Court judges of the Queen's Bench Division, but the bulk of the more
serious cases are dealt with by Circuit judges, full-time judges who
devote most of their time to the Crown Court, although they will also
sit in the County Court exercising civil jurisdiction. There are at pres-
ent about fifty Queen's Bench judges and about 350 Circuit judges. A
large part of the judicial work of the Crown Court is entrusted to part-
time judges called recorders, who hold a judicial appointment and are
expected to sit judicially for a minimum of fourteen days each year,
and assistant recorders (formerly known as deputy circuit judges), who
do not hold an appointment but are approved to sit as and when re-
quired. All appointments and approvals are the responsibility of the
Lord Chancellor; no English judge is elected. Circuit judges, recorders,
and assistant recorders may sit with two or more lay magistrates for the
trial of the less serious types of offence; when magistrates sit in the
Crown Court they sit as judges of the court and have equal voting
rights in matters within the discretion of the court, including sentenc-
ing.' It is not unknown for the lay magistrates to outvote the legally
qualified judge.'
All judges (other than lay magistrates sitting with a circuit judge or
recorder) who sit in the Crown Court are legally qualified - the major-
ity as barristers ° - and most come from a background of professional
practice, although not necessarily in criminal litigation. I" Schemes for
systematically preparing lawyers to sit in the Crown Court were consid-
ered by a working party in 1978,12 and are now under the direction of
7. The distribution of cases between different categories of judges is governed by a
Practice Direction of the Lord Chief Justice. See Practice Direction, 56 Cr. App. R. 52
(1971).
8. Supreme Court Act 1981, § 73.
9. See e.g., R. v. Deary, 1977 CRIM. L. REv. 47, 48.
10. The qualifications for appointment as a Circuit judge are provided by Courts Act
1971, § 16(3) (10 years as a barrister or five years as a recorder); a recorder must be a barris-
ter or solicitor of 10 years standing. Id. § 21(2). In practice, most persons appointed to be
assistant recorders have between 15 and 20 years experience in legal practice.
11. The part-time appointments are increasingly used as probationary steps toward a
permanent appointment as Circuit judge or High Court judge. There is no natural progres-
sion from a Circuit judge to High Court judge, and it is generally assumed that a circuit
judgeship is a terminal appointment, although a small number of High Court appointments
have been made from the circuit bench. The normal progression is now from assistant re-
corder to recorder, and then either to High Court judge or Circuit judge (or neither).
12. See HOME OFFICE AND LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT, JUDICIAL STUDIES
AND INFORMATION (1978), Report of a Working Party (Chairman, Lord Justice Bridge).
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the Judicial Studies Board, a body consisting of judges, lawyers, aca-
demics, and others. Various schemes of preparation (the word "train-
ing" is not used) are now in operation on a modest scale and a recent
Parliamentary Committee recommended that they be expanded. 13
The lay magistrates who adjudicate in the overwhelming majority
of magistrates' courts throughout the country (large cities also make
use of stipendiary magistrates, who are legally qualified) have no pro-
fessional training, although for the last fifteen years training schemes
for magistrates have been in operation in most parts of the country,
with varying degrees of effectiveness. There are at present about 23,000
lay magistrates, each of whom is expected to sit for a minimum of
twenty-four days each year. They are assisted by a Clerk to Justices,
who will now invariably be a qualified lawyer, whose duty is to advise
the magistrates on questions of law (including sentencing practice). 14
In many busy court centres, the magistrates will be assisted by a court
clerk, who may be professionally qualified but will not necessarily be
SO.
The allocation of cases between the two modes of trial was until
1978 the subject of a legal structure of bewildering complexity. 5 Con-
siderable simplification was introduced by the Criminal Law Act
1977.16 The law now divides all offences into three categories: those
triable only on indictment, those triable only summarily, and those tri-
able "either way." In the first two categories, there is no choice to be
made; the mode of trial is determined by the charge. (Although there is
no empirical evidence, there can be little doubt that the implications in
terms of mode of trial are likely to affect the charging decision, particu-
larly in cases of personal violence.) The third category, offences triable
either way, includes those offences that constitute the great bulk of the
criminal court's work - including theft, obtaining by deception, crimi-
nal damage, assault, all but the gravest woundings, indecent assault,
and many forms of burglary. 7 In all of these cases, the initiative lies
with the prosecution, who may invite the magistrates' court (where all
criminal cases begin) to commit the case for trial to the Crown Court or
13. See HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FOURTH REPORT, THE PRISON SERVICE, H.C. 412-
1, paras. 79-84 (1981).
14. The duties of the Clerk are now laid down in a Practice Direction by the Lord Chief
Justice. See Practice Direction, [1981] 2 All. E.R. 831.
15. See Thomas, Committals for Trial and Sentence - the Casefor Simpfcation, 1972
CRIM. L. REV. 477.
16. Criminal Law Act 1977. The relevant provisions are now consolidated as Magis-
trates' Courts Act 1980, §§ 17-28.
17. For a list of the most important offences in this category, see Magistrates' Courts Act
1980, § 17, sched. 1.
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to deal with it summarily. The magistrates' court is not bound to com-
mit the case for trial on the prosecution's application (except when the
prosecutor is the Director of Public Prosecutions) but usually will do
so. The defendant is entitled to make representations, but has no right
to insist on summary trial. If the prosecution asks for summary trial by
the magistrates' court, the magistrates themselves may decide that the
case is more appropriate for trial in the Crown Court and commit it
there.'" The accused person (other than a juvenile) has an unqualified
right to insist that an either way case be tried in the Crown Court, al-
though he undoubtedly will be deterred by the knowledge that the
maximum penalty in the Crown Court invariably will be greater than
that available to the magistrates' court, and that judges in the Crown
Court are often more severe than are magistrates dealing with the same
offence. The accused person who knows he is guilty and is prepared to
plead guilty will see advantages in having the case dealt with by the
magistrates. The defendant who intends to contest the allegations may
well prefer trial by jury,' 9 although some defendants are believed to
insist on trial in the Crown Court, despite their intention to plead
guilty, for the sake of collateral advantages (such as a delay before the
sentence is imposed).20
A major problem of recent years had been to adjust the court sys-
tem so that the number of defendants who exercise this right is not so
great as to produce impossible workloads in the Crown Court.2 I In
practice, the overwhelming majority of cases in the either way category
are tried summarily by magistrates' courts.22
B. Plea Negotiation
Although plea bargaining in English courts was described by an
observer as early as 1820,23 it did not begin to receive serious judicial or
18. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, § 21.
19. See A.E. BOTTOMS & J.D. MCCLEAN, DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ch.
4 (1976).
20. See, e.g, R. v. Carter, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 71 (1980).
21. See REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
CRIMINAL BUSINESS BETWEEN THE CROWN COURT AND THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS,
CMND. 6323 (1975).
22. Eighty one percent were tried summarily in 1981. CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND
AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Table 6.3 (1982). A total of 65,100 persons charged with
either way offences were committed to the Crown Court for trial. The statistics do not show
how many of these were committed on their own election, and how many on the initiative of
either the prosecution or the court.
23. For an early observation of plea bargaining in the English courts, see C. COTTU, DE
L'ADMINISTRATION DE JUSTICE EN ANGLETERRE (1820). Cottu describes a typical plea bar-
gain of the day:
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academic attention until the early 1970's. The issue surfaced in a case
in which an appellant claimed that he had been pressured into pleading
guilty by the threat of a custodial sentence if he were convicted by the
jury.24 The Court of Appeal laid down several rules25 which it has reit-
erated on a number of occasions since then.26 These rules prohibit a
trial judge from giving any indication of his intentions in relation to
sentence before the accused has entered a plea, unless he can say that
the sentence will take the same form whether the accused pleads guilty
or not guilty. The judge is not permitted to make any offer of a sen-
tence conditional on a plea of guilty, 27 nor is he allowed to indicate
what sentence he will impose on a plea of guilty without indicating that
he will impose the same form of sentence following a conviction by the
jury.2 The judge is not permitted to indicate the quantum of a sentence
(the term of imprisonment, the amount of a fine) in any event.29
These strict limitations on what a judge may say in any pre-ar-
raignment discussions are counter-balanced by the well-established
principle that an accused person who pleads guilty normally may ex-
pect a reduction in what otherwise would be considered the appropriate
It happens every day that a forger who is found in possession of forged notes or some-
one who has uttered forged notes is normally charged in two indictments. The first
charges him with having forged or uttered false notes, and the second charges him with
having in his possession false notes with the intention of uttering them. In this situation
when the accused is in the dock ready to plead the prosecution counsel approaches the
prisoner's counsel and asks him if his client would agree to plead guilty on the second
indictment which doesn't involve anything more than transportation, promising him if
he will, the prosecution will not proceed on the first indictment which charges a capital
crime. If the accused agrees with this suggestion, he is immediately sentenced on the
second indictment in accordance with his confession, and so far as the first is concerned
the prosecution counsel tells the jury that he will not call any witnesses and in conse-
quence the jury return a verdict of not guilty in the absence of evidence, and one should
not think that such an incredible transaction takes place in secret. It takes place in open
court in presence of the public, the judge and the jury. I even witnessed myself in
Durham a most unusual case. Of three prisoners accused of uttering forged notes there
was one, a woman, who could not be persuaded by any argument or exhortation either
by her counsel or the prosecution counsel, or even by the judge himself, to agree on the
arrangement which was proposed to her and to plead guilty on the charge of possessing
forged notes with intent. As a consequence, they were obliged to try her on the charge
of uttering and when this was proved she was condemned to death, but eventually her
sentence was commuted to 14 years' transportation.
Id. at 99 (author's translation).
24. R. v. Turner, 54 Cr. App. R. 352, 355 (1970).
25. Id. at 360.
26. See, e.g., R. v. Atkinson, 67 Cr. App. R. 200 (1977).
27. "A statement that on a plea of guilty he would impose one sentence but that on a
conviction following a plea of not guilty he would impose a severer sentence is one which
should never be made." R. v. Turner, 54 Cr. App. R. 352, 360-61 (1970) (Lord Parker, C.J.).
28. Id. at 361.
29. Id. at 360.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sentence. A sentence will be reduced on appeal, in a guilty plea case,
on the sole ground that the trial judge failed to give adequate recogni-
tion to the plea.3 0 The extent of the differentiation which should be
made between the offender who is convicted by the jury and the of-
fender who pleads guilty has not been defined in precise terms, but it
normally would be between a third and a quarter of the theoretically
appropriate sentence. 3I
The Court of Appeal no longer justifies what has become known
as the "discount" by reference to the offender's remorse or prospects of
rehabilitation; the Court tends to recognize more frankly the impor-
tance of guilty pleas to the administration of justice and the saving of
public expenditure.32 The Court, however, is not prepared to tolerate
the imposition of a sentence that it considers disproportionate to the
offence to punish an offender for pleading not guilty. For instance, if a
sentence of imprisonment is imposed in a case which normally would
be dealt with by a fine, because there has been a contest, the sentence
will be reduced.33 The use of inappropriate language by a trial judge
suggesting he has passed a disproportionate sentence because of the
plea of not guilty also will lead to a reduction.34 There is a conflict of
authority about whether an offender's pleading guilty can justify the
suspension of a sentence of imprisonment that otherwise would be
immediate.35
The operation of plea negotiation in the Crown Court has been
investigated in only one study of significance.36 These findings, which
were acutely controversial, suggested widespread disregard of the rules
established by the Court of Appeal. This view is supported by the oc-
currence of a number of appeals subsequent to the publication of this
report in which clear departures from the rules were established.37 It is
possible that the controversy arising from the publication of this report,
30. See, e.g., R. v. Boyd, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 234 (1980).
31. See, e.g., R. v. Meade, 4 Cr. App. R. (S.) 193 (1982); R. v. Robertshorn, 3 Cr. App.
R. (S.) 77 (1981); R. v. Boyd, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 234 (1980).
A difference of this scale between sentences of co-defendants, if one has pleaded
guilty and the other has been convicted after a trial, would be required by the Court of
Appeal. See R. v. Quirke, 4 Crim. App. (S.) 187 (1982).
32. See, e.g., R. v. Davies, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 168, 170 (1980) (Lawton, L.J.).
33. See R. v. Spinks, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 335, 336 (1980).
34. Id. at 335-36.
35. Compare R. v. Tonks, I Cr. App. R. (S.) 293, 295 (1979) with R. v. Hollyman, I Cr.
App. R. (S.) 289, 290 (1979).
36. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE (1977). This report depends
largely upon accounts given by defendants, because the lawyers, citing lawyer-client confi-
dentiality, refused to cooperate. Id. at 8-9.
37. See, e.g., R. v. Bird, 67 Cr. App. R. (S.) 203, 204-06 (1977).
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and the frequent repetition of the principles established in 1970, has
diminished the extent of any direct judicial participation in any form of
plea negotiation, but the "discount" for a plea of guilty remains effec-
tive, and there is some evidence to suggest that this practice is capable
of being abused by defence counsel anxious to persuade a client to
plead guilty by exaggerating the scale of the differences between the
likely sentences.38
A major difference between plea negotiation in England and
America is the limited involvement of the prosecution. The prosecu-
tion is not permitted to make any sentencing recommendation, and any
appearance of direct intervention by the prosecution in the sentencing
process is regarded as verging on the improper. It is the prosecution's
duty, however, to outline the facts of the offence to the court on a plea
of guilty, and this may lead to some negotiation of the version of the
facts to be put before the judge: the defendant may indicate that he
will plead guilty to the indictment if his account of the incident is ac-
cepted for the purpose of sentence. The judge is not necessarily bound
by such an indication, but if the prosecution agrees with the defend-
ant's version, the judge will have little justification for adopting a dif-
ferent view. Although an accused person pleading guilty who disputes
the details of the prosecution evidence is entitled to present evidence
after pleading to persuade the court to accept his version of the facts for
the purpose of sentence,39 it is obviously more satisfactory from his
point of view if the prosecution will agree to put the case forward on
the same basis, rather than on the more serious basis which may be
disclosed in the evidence available to the prosecution. In some cases,
this process may go so far as to involve the prosecution dropping a
charge and accepting a plea to a lesser offence. This is a highly visible
act of which the judge may require an explanation,4 ° but where the
graver charge is dropped, the judge must sentence on the basis that the
defendant is innocent of the graver charge, however artificial the result
may seem.4'
C. Appellate Review of Sentences
One of the most important features of the English sentencing sys-
tem is the provision for appellate review of sentences, particularly those
passed in the Crown Court. Virtually every offender sentenced in the
38. J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, supra note 36, at 46-56.
39. R. v. Milligan, 4 Cr. App. R. (S.) 2 (1982).
40. See, e.g., R. v. Emmanuel, 74 Cr. App. R. 135 (1981).
41. See, e.g., R. v. Booker, 4 Cr. App. R. (S.) 53 (1982); R. v. Clutterham, 4 Cr. App. R.
(S.) 40 (1982).
19831
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Crown Court may appeal against his sentence to the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division).42 This court normally consists of the Lord Chief
Justice, or an appeal court judge (Lord Justice), and one or two High
Court judges. A significant number of offenders seek review of their
sentences (4,571 in 1981), and in an average year the Court will deliver
over 1,000 judgments in cases where the appeal is against sentence
only.43
Apart from providing for the correction of errors made by the trial
judges, and in particular providing a restraint on excessive severity, the
Court's work provides a case law of sentencing which serves as a sys-
tem of judicially-evolved guidelines for trial judges. Appellate review
provides a forum within the judicial system where questions of policy
and principle can be raised and resolved, and contributes to the devel-
opment of some measure of consistency in the sentencing of offenders
for the more serious offences, without seriously diminishing the impor-
tance of judicial discretion in the individual case. Appellate review of
sentences has been part of the English system since before any judge
now sitting was born. It is accepted as an inevitable and helpful part of
the sentencing process by trial judges. There is no evidence that Eng-
lish trial judges, unlike some American judges, resent the idea of appel-
late review of sentences.
1. Sentencingprinciples - The principles evolved through the process
of appellate review of sentences are too extensive and complex to be
described in the course of an article,44 but a few general statements can
be made. The decisions of the Court cover a wide range of sentencing
issues: matters of general principle (when should sentences of impris-
onment be ordered to run consecutively and when concurrently, how
far is it permissible to distinguish between accomplices convicted of
participating in the same crimes); the use of particular sentencing pow-
ers (when should a court order the payment of compensation by the
offender to the victim, what criteria should be considered in making a
recommendation for deportation); the sentencing of different categories
of offenders (mentally disturbed offenders, dangerous offenders); and
the effect of mitigation. Two topics of particular importance are the
proper treatment of specific types of offences and the procedural as-
pects of sentencing.
A large proportion of the Court's decisions are concerned with ad-
42. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, ch. 19, § 10.
43. CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Table 6.8 (1982).
44. For a detailed analysis, see generally D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING
(1979).
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justing the lengths of sentences imposed in particular types of crimes.
When considered collectively, these decisions provide useful indica-
tions to trial judges of what the Court of Appeal considers the appro-
priate sentence length for particular types of crime. Individual cases
usually are not treated as binding precedents, but it is common for
counsel to cite a group of similar decisions to indicate the "bracket"
within which sentences for a particular type of case might be expected
to fall. Occasionally the Court will formulate detailed guidelines: Re-
cently the Lord Chief Justice, dismissing an appeal against a sentence
of imprisonment for rape, indicated that a custodial sentence should be
imposed in all cases of rape unless there were exceptional circum-
stances, and listed a series of aggravating factors which would lead to a
sentence of greater than usual length." Other decisions indicate the
length of sentence that should be imposed in a case of rape not affected
by these factors.' Another example of sentencing guidelines was given
in 1980, when concern over the continuing rise of the prison population
lead to a series of decisions in which the Lord Chief Justice indicated
that the sentences conventionally imposed for certain types of nonvio-
lent offence might be reduced.47 Although these guidelines were not as
carefully thought out as they might have been, they have had some
impact on the sentences passed in the trial courts: The prison popula-
tion remains too large for the prison system to accommodate, it appears
that at least the growth in the population has been contained for the
time being."'
Also of particular interest are those decisions concerned with the
procedural aspects of sentencing. A whole range of procedural and evi-
dential issues have been examined in recent years, such as the infer-
ences that may properly be drawn from the jury's verdict, the use in
determining the culpability of a particular defendant of evidence given
at the trial of his accomplice, and the procedures for settling disputed
issues of fact relevant to sentence when the defendant has pleaded
guilty. An increasingly sophisticated body of law is in the process of
evolving in this context.49
45. R. v. Roberts, 4 Cr. App. R. (S.) 8 (1982).
46. See, e.g., R. v. Richards, 3 Cr. App. R. (S.) 132 (1981).
47. R. v. Bibi, 71 Cr. App. R. (S.) 177, 178-79 (1980).
48. The sentenced population on June 30, 1981, was 36,669; on the same date in 1980 it
was 36,637. See PRISON STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8654, Table l(c)
(1982).
49. For a discussion of recent decisions see Thomas, The Law of Sentencing - Some
Unresolved Legal Issues in Criminal Justice, Paper prepared for presentation at the Cana-
dian Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference on Criminal Justice (Oxner ed.
1982).
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2. Limitations on Appellate Review - Despite the great value of ap-
pellate review, the English system is subject to a number of limitations
which reduce its effective scope. One of these is that only the offender
may appeal, and the Court must not impose a sentence on appeal that
is more severe than the sentence imposed in the trial court. 50 As a re-
suit, the overwhelming majority of appeals are against sentences of im-
prisonment or other forms of custody.5 For this reason, the case law
produced by the Court concentrates heavily on such questions as the
proper length of sentences for particular categories of offence, the need
to establish proper relationships in the sentences imposed on co-de-
fendants, and the propriety of imposing consecutive sentences in partic-
ular circumstances. Issues relating to the proper use of noncustodial
sentences - such as probation or community service - are less fre-
quently examined, unless the Court decides to vary a sentence from
imprisonment to a noncustodial measure. The case law of sentencing
in England thus is relatively rich in detail in relation to all matters
affecting custody, but thin and poorly developed in relation to the use
of noncustodial measures.
There is some limited development of the case law in relation to
noncustodial measures: In the past the Court has taken initiatives (for
instance in the use of probation for habitual petty offenders) by substi-
tuting noncustodial measures on appeal for custodial sentences, but this
practice is limited because many appellants originally sentenced to im-
prisonment have served part of the sentence before the appeal is heard
(relatively few appellants are granted bail pending appeal). When the
Court hears the appeal and decides that the custodial sentence was in-
appropriate, it often will be reluctant to substitute the noncustodial
measure which should have been imposed by the trial court, because
the offender already has undergone a more onerous penalty for the of-
fence. If the Court thinks that an offender who has been sentenced to
imprisonment should have been fined, there is a tendency not to im-
pose the fine, but simply to reduce the length of the sentence to allow
the offender's immediate release. The result of this kind of decision
may be to give a misleading impression of what the Court really thinks
the right sentence to be in such a case: the judgment of the Court may
seem to indicate that the proper means of dealing with the case is a
short term of imprisonment. 52
50. See Criminal Appeal Act 1968, § 11(3).
51. Ninety-five percent of all applications for leave to appeal against sentence in 1981
were by persons sentenced to immediate imprisonment, borstal training, or detention.
CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981 CMND. 8668, Table 6.9 (1982).
52. See, e.g., R. v. Goldstraw, 3 Cr. App. R. (S.) 173 (1981).
[VOL. 42
SENTENCING IN ENGLAND
The only satisfactory way to provide a basis for the development
of a case law of sentencing which would adequately cover the full range
of sentencing options available to courts, and provide a restraint on the
excessive leniency of some judges is to allow the prosecution to seek
review of a sentence on the ground that it is too favourable to the de-
fendant. The early proposals for legislation on appellate review of
sentences recognized this, and many of the unsuccessful bills intro-
duced in the late nineteenth century to create a court of appeal in crim-
inal cases would have allowed the prosecution to challenge a sentence.
Further, judicial opinion in the 1890's was in favour of such a
scheme.53 The legislation which was eventually enacted did not pro-
vide such a right of appeal, although it compromised to the extent of
allowing the Court to increase the severity of a sentence when the of-
fender appealed. 4 Although this power was rarely used, it was thought
to deter many potential appellants from seeking review of their
sentences, and it was removed in 1966.55 Attempts have been made in
recent years to amend the law to allow the prosecution to appeal
against sentences (usually such proposals come to the fore in the light
of a particularly controversial sentence), but it is clear that the present
political climate is unfavourable - despite the acceptance of prosecu-
tion appeals as a normal part of the appellate system in other Com-
monwealth countries including Canada.5
6
A second limitation on the effective contribution of appellate re-
view to the development of sentencing principles has been (until re-
cently) the lack of an adequate system of reporting sentencing
decisions. All law reporting in England is selective, and is left to the
initiative of various independent commercial publishers; there is no of-
ficial reporter system. There are a number of general series of law re-
ports: the Law Reports published by the Incorporated Council of Law
Reporters (which are the most prestigious), the Weekly Law Reports,
the All England Law Reports, and a number of specialist series of re-
ports which deal only with cases related to particular topics and which
include the Criminal Appeal Reports. These reports have given little
attention to sentencing cases except for the relatively small number
which deal with questions of law in the narrowest sense - the interpre-
tation of statutory powers of sentence, for instance. Broader issues of
sentencing policy largely have been ignored, except by a specialist jour-
53. See D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 75-93 (1979).
54. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, §§ 4(3), 5.
55. Criminal Appeal Act 1966, § 4(2).
56. For the most recent Parliamentary Debate on this matter, see H.C. DEBATES 1982
vol. 23 cols. 815-33.
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nal - the Criminal Law Review - which has carried summaries of
selected sentencing cases together with commentaries. More recently a
new series of reports devoted exclusively to sentencing decisions has
been published and is becoming an important tool of the lawyer and
sentencing judge." This series reports about 180 decisions each year -
about one decision in six of those reached by the Court. The problem
of reporting sentencing decisions is one which must be resolved if any
system of appellate review is to have any impact on the sentencing pro-
cess in the trial courts. Inadequate reporting means that the whole sys-
tem of appellate review is a failure, so far as guidance to trial judge and
the development of sentencing principles is concerned, but there is
equally a danger of excessive reporting. If too many decisions are re-
ported, most of which Will be of a routine character, those that are of
lasting or general significance will be lost in a mass of useless material,
and as a result may be overlooked.
A third weakness of the English system of appellate review, which
may be a temporary one, is a result of the continuing concern with the
prison population. At one level, this has led to the development of a
new sentencing strategy, but at another it has resulted in appeals being
allowed where there is no real reason for criticizing the sentence im-
posed by the trial court, and often where the trial judge clearly has
endeavoured to follow guidelines developed by the Court of Appeal in
other cases.58 Often, the Court seems to see its role as that of a parole
board, basing its decision on the behaviour of the appellant in prison
while serving his sentence rather than on the question whether the sen-
tence imposed by the trial judge was correct in principle and within the
conventional limits for the kind of offence in question.59 This ap-
proach, which may in part be the result of the fact that many judges
have served as members of the parole board, is a matter of grave con-
cern. It is clearly capable of producing inconsistent and anomalous de-
cisions at the Court of Appeal level, which confuse trial court judges as
to the correct principle to be applied in a particular type of case. This
approach also makes it impossible for lawyers to advise defendants
whether they should appeal, with the result that an increasing number
of defendants will appeal. This will in turn cause increasing delays in
the determination of appeals. More seriously, inconsistency in the Ap-
peal Court will undermine its authority in the eyes of the trial judges,
who will come to regard the outcome of an appeal as a matter of
57. This new series is entitled Criminal Appeal Reports (sentencing) (cited as Cr. App.
R. (S.)), Published since 1979 by Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., one volume annually.
58. See, e.g., R. v. Scott, 1982 CRiM. L. REV. 239, 240.
59. See, e.g., R. v. Roe, 1982 CRIM. L. Rv. 57.
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chance and look elsewhere for guidance on matters of sentencing prin-
ciple. The tendency of the court to this kind of inconsistency is a rela-
tively recent development, and there is every reason to hope that it will
prove to be a temporary phase associated with general changes in sen-
tencing practice and that the more predictable practice of the sixties
and early seventies will be restored.
D. Parole
The idea that an offender might shorten his sentence by his beha-
viour while undergoing it, and that the promise of a reduction could
provide an incentive to conformity both during the sentence and possi-
bly afterwards, was well recognized in England by the eighteenth cen-
tury. One sentence of that period - transportation (described below)
- was subject to a variety of procedures that could lead to an offender
securing his release from the obligation imposed by the sentence long
before the term pronounced by the court had expired. 60 The sentence
that in the mid-nineteenth century replaced transportation - penal
servitude61 - was in theory an indeterminate sentence, allowing re-
lease on licence at the discretion of the executive,62 although it never
operated as such in practice: Release was allowed after a predeter-
mined portion of the sentence had expired. 63 By 1948, when penal ser-
vitude and imprisonment were merged into the same form of
sentence,' the position was that any person sentenced to imprisonment
was released automatically after serving two-thirds of the sentence. Al-
though the language of the relevant statutory provision was (and re-
mains) permissive rather than mandatory, in practice prisoners were
considered to be entitled to be so released, unless ordered to lose remis-
sion as a sanction through the disciplinary machinery of the prison sys-
tem.65  The only exceptions were: offenders sentenced to life
imprisonment, who after 1948 were eligible for release on license at any
time in their sentence without having served a stipulated minimum pe-
riod, but who would remain on licence for the rest of their lives;66
young adult offenders sentenced to borstal training (roughly analogous
to an American reform school) or to be detained in a detention cen-
60. See D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 31 (1979).
61. See infra note 92.
62. See Penal Servitude Act, 1853, 16 and 17 Vic., ch. 99.
63. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE WORKING
OF THE PENAL SERVITUDE AcTs, C. 2368, para. 37 and app. A5 (1879).
64. See Criminal Justice Act, 1948, ch. 58, § 1.
65. See Prison Act, 1952, § 25 and Prison Rules, STAT. INST. No. 388, Rule 5 (1964).
66. The current provision is Criminal Justice Act 1967, § 61.
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tre;67 and persons who were sentenced to imprisonment while under the
age of twenty-one.68 The last category normally were released after
serving two-thirds of the sentence, but on licence, and there was power
to continue to detain them after they had reached the two-thirds point.
The parole scheme now in operation was introduced in the Crimi-
nal Justice Act 1967. The justification for its introduction, in the words
of the Home Secretary of the day, was that many offenders sentenced to
imprisonment reach "a recognizable peak in their training at which
they may respond to generous treatment, but after which, if kept in
prison, they may go down hill.' ' 69 A more realistic explanation of its
appearance on the statute book at that time was that its sponsors be-
lieved it would help to control the growth of the prison population
which had been increasing steadily since the end of the second world
war, and which was beginning to strain the capacity of the prison
system.
The system introduced in 1967 involved a cumbersome three-stage
procedure and made no concessions to the principles of openness, fair-
ness, and accountability. An offender sentenced to imprisonment be-
comes eligible for release on licence after serving one-third of his
sentence or twelve months, whichever is greater, and the scheme there-
fore effectively excludes about eighty percent of offenders sentenced to
imprisonment, because their terms do not exceed eighteen months.7 °
The decision to release a prisoner on licence requires three stages of
assessment: first by a local review committee attached to the prison
where he is serving the sentence; then by the national Parole Board,
operating through small panels of its membership; and finally by the
Home Secretary, who has authority to deny release despite a recom-
mendation by the Parole Board. The system inevitably takes several
months to process a particular case, and the prisoner is not entitled to
any hearing by a decision-maker at any stage (although he is entitled to
an interview with one member of the local review committee) or to any
explanation of the reason why he has been denied release. If he is re-
leased on licence he remains on licence, and subject to the possibility of
being recalled to prison, until the expiration of the second third of his
sentence. At this point the licence terminates and the offender is free of
67. See Criminal Justice Act, 1961, § 1, sched. 1, and Prison Act, 1952, § 45.
68. Criminal Justice Act, 1948. Proposals to extend this scheme to offenders aged up to
26 were enacted in Criminal Justice Act, 1961, 20, but never implemented.
69. Remarks of the former Home Secretary, Mr. R. Jenkins, 738 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 70 (1966).
70. See PRISON STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1981 CMND. 8654, Table 4.2 (1982).
Of 36,368 males sentenced to imprisonment in 1981, only 6,911 (19%) were sentenced to
terms longer than eighteen months. Id.
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restrictions except in certain cases of persistent offenders sentenced to
extended terms of imprisonment, young prisoners sentenced to impris-
onment before the age of twenty-one, and persons serving life impris-
onment. The length of the parole selection process, coupled with the
relative shortness of the majority of sentences of imprisonment, means
that many prisoners released on licence are subject to licence for a rela-
tively short period, in the majority of cases between three and twelve
months.7
Despite the benevolent intentions of its promoters, the parole sys-
tem has been a focus of criticism since its earliest days.72 The secrecy
of the Board's processes, the absence of any effective participation by
the prisoner, the lack of any clearly defined criteria for decision-mak-
ing, and the fact that the ultimate decision is taken on behalf of a min-
ister who is politically accountable - one of the few instances in the
English criminal justice system where decisions are taken by elected
officials - have combined to turn a substantial body of informed opin-
ion against the system and in favour of its abolition or substantial mod-
ification. Criticism of the system has led to only one significant change
in the legal framework. To expedite decision-making in selected cases,
provision was made in 1972 for cases to be referred directly to the
Home Secretary by the local review committee without the intervening
step of review by the national Parole Board. 73 About one-third of the
cases where parole is granted are now handled under this procedure.
The Board has resisted pressure for changes in its procedure in the di-
rection of greater openness and accountability, and the courts have
held that there is no legal obligation on the board to give reasons for
declining to recommend release.74
Despite the strong body of opinion against the parole system in its
present form the government recently has secured the passage of legis-
lation which may significantly extend the scope of parole. The Crimi-
nal Justice Act 1982 contains a provision 75 enabling the Home
Secretary to reduce the minimum period of twelve months which must
be served before a prisoner becomes eligible for release, and thus ex-
tends the parole system to a much larger proportion of prisoners. This
provision; one result of continuing anxieties surrounding the growth of
71. The average length of licence of prisoners released on parole in 1981 was eight
months and 29 days. PAROLE BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT for 1981, H.C. 338 (1982).
72. For a collection of papers reflecting some of the criticisms, see PAROLE: ITS IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PENAL SYSTEMS (D.A. Thomas ed. 1974).
73. Criminal Justice Act 1972, § 35.
74. See Payne v. Lord Harris, [19811 1 W.L.R. 754.
75. Criminal Justice Act 1982, § 33.
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the prison population, has not yet been used. If the scope of the parole
scheme is expanded without significant procedural changes, there can
be little doubt that the problems which confront the parole system, par-
ticularly that of delay, will be gravely aggravated.
This is the context in which the modem English system of sentenc-
ing has evolved. The next section of the article describes briefly the
evolution from the haphazard savagery of the late eighteenth century to
the more refined procedures of the late nineteenth century, and then
offers an account of the current law of sentencing, focusing on the pow-
ers of the courts and the mechanisms for their control.
II. THE SENTENCING PROCESS
A. The Historical Background
English judges did not assume anything like their modem role in
the sentencing process until the middle years of the nineteenth century.
The earlier common law allowed judges no formal discretion in felony
cases, and an almost unlimited discretion in misdemeanour cases. Un-
til the early nineteenth century, the standard penalty for all felonies
was death. The severity of this system was mitigated to some extent,
but in an arbitrary and capricious manner, by two developments, which
represented the first stages of the establishment of judicial discretion as
the central feature of the sentencing process.
The first of these developments was the intervention and elabora-
tion of the concept of benefit of clergy. By this means an expanding
category of offenders was entitled, on conviction for a capital offence,
to be discharged without any substantial penalty upon demonstrating
literacy by reciting the "neck verse," which most potential convicts
would learn by heart.76 The extension of capital punishment on the
English statute book during the eighteenth century was accomplished
as much by the removal of benefit of clergy as by the enactment of new
capital provisions." This tendency was balanced by the growing prac-
tice of granting a judicial reprieve or temporary stay of execution, to
enable a prisoner under sentence of death to petition the king for a
conditional pardon, under which the prisoner would be pardoned on
condition of transportation to one of the colonies for a specified mini-
mum period of time - seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, or life. 8
76. For an account of the development of benefit of clergy, see I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, ch. 13 (1883).
77. Id. at 469-71.
78. See generally 1 L. RADZINOWiCZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW: THE
MOVEMENT FOR REFORM (1948).
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Judicial discretion in sentencing in felony cases originated in the form
of the decision whether to reprieve the offender to enable him to peti-
tion for mercy - which in many cases, but not all, resulted in the ex-
pected pardon7 9 - or to leave the offender for execution, in which case
he would be executed within a short time after conclusion of the as-
sizes. The system did not provide an appeal during this period, and
offered only a limited opportunity to petition for mercy. The arbitrari-
ness of this scheme was as obvious to contemporary observers8° as it
has been to later historians.8" One of the earliest discussions of judicial
discretion in sentencing, and the problems of containing disparity
within reasonable limits, concerned judicial discretion in this sense.82
The second major development occurred in the early nineteenth
century, when the campaign for the repeal of the capital statutes gained
momentum, and the structure of the penalty system underwent trans-
formation (between 1825 and 1840). In this relatively short period the
foundations of the new penalty structure were laid, and the basis of the
modem role of the judiciary in the sentencing process was estab-
lished.83 Three points are worth making. First, parliamentary and
public debate at this time focussed on the reduction and abolition of
the death penalty, rather than on the creation of a satisfactory alterna-
tive scheme of penalties. The piecemeal process by which the death
penalty was abolished, one offence at a time, meant that the nature of
the penalty that replaced it owed more to the politics of that particular
debate than to any overall scheme of rationalisation. Determined op-
position to the abolition of the death penalty would result in the substi-
tution of the most severe sanction under the new system: mandatory
transportation for life. Where there was no serious opposition to aboli-
tion, the proponents of change would propose, and Parliament would
79. Eighteenth century practice is neatly captured in the preamble to a statute enacted in
1768 to expedite the procedure of transportation. The preamble recited that "Whereas sev-
eral offenders, convicted of crimes for which they are by law excluded from benefit of clergy,
are reprieved by the judge who tries them, and recommended by him to His Majesty: who
generally, on such recommendation, is graciously pleased to extend the same to them, on
condition of transportation to some of His Majesty's colonies and plantations in America for
life, or for the term of fourteen years," but pointed out that as the convict had to remain in
custody until the next assizes when the order for transportation could be made "such offend-
ers lie several months in gaol after conviction whereby they are rendered less capable of
being useful to the publick in the parts of America to which they are sent." Statute of 1768,
8 Geo. 3, ch. 5. The Act authorized the judge who had granted the reprieve to make the
order for transportation outside assizes without waiting for the next session.
80. See S. ROMILLY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 24-25 (1810).
81. See Hay, Property and Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE
(Hay ed. 1975).
82. S. ROMILLY, supra note 80 at 24-25.
83. See D.A. THOMAS, THE PENAL EQUATION 9 (1978).
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enact, a less severe penalty. As a result, the new penalty structure
which emerged in this critical period of change was devoid of any ap-
pearance of logic or principle, a fact which was not overlooked by re-
formers of the period.84
The second significant point is that the alternative penalty which
was replacing the death penalty on the statute book (having already
largely replaced it in judicial and administrative practice through the
system of conditional pardon) - transportation - was by that time
obviously itself in the last stages of its existence. Transportation under
conditional pardon following conviction of a capital offence originated
in the early seventeenth century, and was well enough established by
1679 to be recognised in the Habeas Corpus Act.85 As a sentence im-
posed by the court itself (as opposed to a term of a conditional pardon),
transportation became firmly established by the Transportation Act
1717. After the loss of the American colonies in 1776 caused a tempo-
rary halt to transportation, the practice was resumed with the discovery
of Australia, and continued for another seventy-five years. By the
1830's, when the reduction of the death penalty was reaching its climax,
the system of transportation was scrutinised and thoroughly con-
demned by a parliamentary committee. 86 Despite doubts about the
continuing viability of transporation raised by this report, the new pen-
alty structure was created in terms of transportation. The modern
structure of maximum terms of imprisonment in English criminal law
is to a large extent directly derived from the terms of transportation
established at this time.
The third noteworthy aspect of this period is that informed opin-
ion of the time opposed the establishment of judicial discretion as the
centrepiece of the sentencing structure. The example of the operation
of judicial discretion under the eighteenth-century capital statutes was
clear to the reformers, who were heavily influenced by the observations
of Romilly.87 The Criminal Law Commissioners, who laboured for
fifteen years to produce a draft criminal code with a rational and coher-
ent penalty structure, were not attracted by the idea of wide-ranging
judicial discretion. They preferred a system very much closer to the
concept of the presumptive sentence than to the modern English sen-
84. See FOURTH REPORT OF HER MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW (168)
(1839).
85. See D.A. THOMAS, THE PENAL EQUATION 2-3 (1978).
86. SELECT COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, H.C. 669 (1838).
87. S. RoMILLY, supra note 80, at 24-25.
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tencing system.88 Their ideas on the sentencing structure disappeared
from sight with their draft criminal code, which ran into political oppo-
sition in 1854 and was abandoned.8 9 The establishment of judicial dis-
cretion came about almost by accident. Many of the early bills which
were introduced to replace the death penalty with a term of transporta-
tion made no provision for discretion in the determination of the term
of transportation. Following the pattern of the Transportation Act
1717, which remained on the statute book until 1827, reform bills of the
early nineteenth century usually provided transportation for a specified
period. Parliament resolved disagreement about the proposed terms of
transportation by substituting a formula that allowed transportation for
not more than that period, and thus at the discretion of the court.90 In
some cases, statutes originally enacted with provisions requiring trans-
portation for a fixed period were subsequently amended to allow judi-
cial discretion.9'
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the foundations of the
modem sentencing structure could be discerned. Transportation had
given way to penal servitude, a sentence which was in law, if not in
practice, sharply distinguished from imprisonment; 92 judicial discretion
88. Whilst the gradations of peremptory punishment to be inflicted without the
power of mitigation are necessarily limited, the degrees and shades of guilt are
infinite, and it rarely happens that a crime defined either simply or with aggrava-
tions does not admit of varieties which require distinction in respect of punish-
ment: wherever the law constitutes an offence, which in its circumstances admits of
great variety as to the degree of guilt, any certain fixed punishment is liable to great
objection. If such a penalty were adapted to the highest degree of atrocity of which
the crime was capable it would be far too severe, and the preventive energy of the
law would be weakened by the operation of the principle already adverted to; were
such fixed punishment accommodated to the slightest of the cases comprehended
by the law, its preventive force would also be diminished for want of means of
punishment adequate to the nature of the crime; were a fixed medium punishment
to be appointed, it would partake of both defects. The only practicable mode of
surmounting the difficulty seems to be by the constitution of limits sufficiently
adapted to the extremes, leaving the various innumerable intermediate cases which
cannot be provided for by any set definitions, to the exercise of judicial discretion.
Such a course of proceeding is to a small and partial extent open to objec-
tion on the score of uncertainty of punishment. This is, however, an imperfection
necessarily incident to every system of human law, and the only practical inference
to be derived from the consideration is, that endeavour ought to be made to confine
the mischief within the narrowest practicable limits.
SEVENTH REPORT OF HER MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW 94 (448) (1943).
See also SECOND REPORT OF HIS MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW (343)
(1836), and FOURTH REPORT OF HER MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW (448)
(1839).
89. D.A. THOMAS, THE PENAL EQUATION 34 (1978).
90. Id. at 11-18.
91. Id.
92. Penal servitude was originally intended as a form of forced labor without necessarily
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had become firmly established in sentencing in all but the few remain-
ing capital offences; and a range of maximum penalties, originally es-
tablished as terms of transportation and then converted to penal
servitude, had been placed on the statute book. Despite their lack of
rationality, these features were entrenched in the Consolidation Acts of
1861,9 which were to constitute the central core of English criminal
law for the next hundred years, until the beginning of the current pe-
riod of criminal law reform in the 1960's.
The later part of the nineteenth century saw two principal devel-
opments. Debate on the sentencing structure during this period fo-
cussed on the problem of controlling sentencing disparities on the part
of the judges.9 4 This debate was made more energetic by the develop-
ment of wide and obvious differences in the treatment of persistent of-
fenders, who had become more conspicuous to sentencers as a result of
the successive decline of the capital statutes and the system of transpor-
tation - "the stoppage of that great sewer which for so many years
carried away the dregs of our population."95 A variety of suggestions
for the control of judicial sentencing discretion were canvassed, many
of them embrionic forms of ideas that have been revived in the current
American debate on sentencing reform. Sentencing commissions,9 6 the
development of conventions through informal and formal processes of
consultations among judges,97 sentencing conferences, 98 appellate re-
view,99 and a crude form of the "guidelines" system based on a statisti-
cal analysis of actual sentencing practice, 1°° all had their advocates.
involving continued incarceration. Imprisonment during this period, on the other hand, re-
quired solitary confinement.
93. For discussion of the Consolidation Acts, see D.A. THOMAS, THE PENAL EQUATION
32-42 (1979).
94. For an account of the currents of debate in the late nineteenth century, see D.A.
THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT (1979).
95. M. HILL, SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF CRIME 185 (1857).
96. See D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 67-68 (1979); Radzinowicz &
Hood, Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Standards. Victorian Attempts to Solve a Perrennial
Problem, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1288, 1320 (1979).
97. See Stephen, Variations in the Punishment of Crime, 2 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
75-93 (1885).
98. E.W. Cox, PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT AS APPLIED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW BY JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES XiX (1877).
99. See Return of Report of the Judges in 1892 to the Lord Chancellor Recommending the
Constitution of a Court of Appeal and Revision of Sentences in Criminal Cases, 17 PARL.
PAPERS 173, 179 (1894).
100. See Crackenthorpe, Can Sentences be Standardised?, 47 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
103 (1900). Crackenthorpe proposed that six judges hould be invited to indicate "what are
the average sentences he would pronounce, apart from special circumstances, on an adult
male who had been convicted of those offences which most commonly recur," and a similar
exercise would be carried out for hypothetical offenders with several prior convictions. The
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This period saw the publication of what is almost certainly the first
attempt at a systematic textbook on sentencing.'' By the turn of the
century, appellate review of sentences as a means of securing some
measure of consistency had become the idea most attractive to judicial
and political opinion, and it was eventually established in 1907, al-
though its real impact was not felt for several decades."0 2
The other main current of thought during the late nineteenth cen-
tury was the rehabilitative ideal. From 1870 onwards the English stat-
ute book began to reflect the idea that criminals either should be
reformed by training or detained for the protection of society. The im-
pact of these ideas on the legal structure of sentencing became obvious
in 1907 with the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act 0 3 and in
the following year with the Prevention of Crime Act,"~ creating the
concepts of borstal training0 5 and preventive detention of habitual of-
fenders. The marked distinction between English and American sen-
tencing law which began to emerge at this time was the separation in
England of punitive and therapeutic concepts into different forms of
sentence. Possibly as a result of the unambiguously punitive terminol-
ogy of long-term incarceration - known as penal servitude until 1948
- the idea of incarceration as a rehabilitative process was rejected,
except in special institutions under special sentencing structures. Im-
prisonment and penal servitude remained firmly punitive in concept
and judicial sentencing practice, and also remained determinate (sub-
ject to the practices of remitting a predetermined portion of the sen-
tence for good behaviour) until the introduction of the parole system in
1967.
The rehabilitative ideal was reflected in a variety of special forms
of sentence, which were added to the statute book one by one over a
period of sixty-five years: probation 16 (imposed in lieu of any other
"average of those averages" would then form the basis of "a table of units forming an ap-
proximate scale of punishment which would be prima facie appropriate to certain named
crimes." Judges would retain discretion to determine the sentence to be imposed in any
actual case; but "any deviation from the normal limits would have to be justified by him in
open court, if only out of respect for the table."
101. E.W. Cox, PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT (1877).
102. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907. For the background to the Act, see D.A. THOMAS, CON-
STRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 75-93 (1979).
103. Probation of Offenders Act, 1907.
104. Prevention of Crime Act, 1908.
105. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
106. Originally introduced for offenders in general by the Probation of Offenders Act,
1907, the legislation establishing probation was re-enacted in the Criminal Justice Act, 1948,
and subsequently was consolidated in the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, §§ 2-13.
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sentence); borstal training; 10 7 corrective training °8 (abolished in 1967);
hospital orders,' I which together with various forms of preventive con-
finement such as preventive detention for habitual offenders," 0 under-
went various modifications of form and name to become the current
extended sentence;"I ' and the judicially evolved use of life imprison-
ment as a means of dealing with dangerous offenders." 2 Until rela-
tively recently, the two systems have been kept distinct in the legal
framework. Most forms of sentence, both in their legislative form and
in the judicial concept of their proper scope, have been identifiable
either as punitive sentences governed by concepts of proportionality,
just deserts, and culpability, or measures - whether therapeutic or pre-
ventive - based on a prediction of the offender's likely future beha-
viour and not limited by reference to his culpability. The result has
been the evolution of a two-sided sentencing system, through both leg-
islative and judicial development, offering the sentencer the choice be-
tween a punitive sentence, reflecting the concepts of desert, and a
forward-looking sentence resting on an assessment of the offender's
needs. '11 The existence of appellate review of sentences has provided a
forum, subject to the limitations discussed earlier, for the articulation
of principle in both of these contexts - on the one hand the develop-
ment of a series of conventions regulating the use of imprisonment and
the determination of the lengths of sentences of imprisonment, infor-
mally but misleadingly known as the tariff, and on the other hand (but
to a lesser extent) a series of criteria for the use of therapeutic sentences
such as borstal training.
B. The Modern Legal Framework
1. Imprisonment - Although the maximum terms of imprisonment
that may be imposed for the most common criminal offences were es-
tablished in the nineteenth century as terms of transportation or penal
servitude, most of the statutes under which sentences of imprisonment
are imposed have been the subject of revision within the last twenty
107. Borstal training was introduced by the Prevention of Crime Act, 1908, §§ 1-9,
amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 48, and the Criminal Justice Act, 1961, §§ 11-
13, and is now to be abolished by Criminal Justice Act 1982.
108. Corrective training was introduced by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 21, sched. 3,
and abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1967, § 103(2), sched. 7.
109. Hospital orders were introduced by the Mental Health Act, 1959, §§ 60-80.
110. Preventive detention was introduced by the Prevention of Crime Act, 1908, § 10, and
substantially amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 21, and by the Criminal Justice
Act 1967, §§ 37-38.
111. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 28.
112. See D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 300-07 (1979).
113. Id. at 8-14.
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years. The Theft Act 1968 was designed to provide traditionally high
maximum penalties, within which judicial discretion would set the op-
erating levels, 114 and the same principle was adopted in the penalty
structure of the Criminal Damage Act 197 1."' The Sexual Offences
Act 1956 is a consolidation of nineteenth-century statutes, and retains
the anomalies of that period: for example, the maximum penalty for
indecently assaulting a male person is ten years, while indecent assault
on a female over thirteen is punishable with a maximum of two years.
Many of the other statutes under which sentences of imprisonment are
commonly imposed (including the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) have
been the subject of parliamentary consideration in modem times. The
only part of substantive criminal law contributing significantly to the
prison population that has not been the subject of legislation in the last
twenty years is that of personal violence (Offences against the Person
Act 1861). Proposals for revision of the relevant legislation, and its
penalty structure, are under discussion at the present time." l6
In practice, the maximum penalties provided by legislation have
little impact on the day-to-day operation of the sentencing process," 17
which is much more closely regulated by the practice of the Court of
Appeal and by conventions shared by the judiciary. With the excep-
tion of a few offences for which the maximum sentence is set at a level
which is lower than many judges would wish, the majority of sentences
imposed are far below the permitted maximum sentence. In a system
empowering courts to impose life imprisonment for a wide range of
offences, the average length of sentence imposed for indictable offences
in the Crown Court in 1981 was 17.9 months." I Average sentences in
particular cases reflect this gap between the statutory maximum and
routine practice. 19
The mechanism by which the lengths of sentences of imprison-
ment are controlled in practice is known as "the tariff." Although this
term was first applied to sentencing by a high court judge, 120 and is at
least a century old in this usage, it is not favoured by judges, although
114. See CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, EIGHTH REPORT, THEFT AND RELATED
OFFENCES, CMND. 2977, T 10-12 (1966).
115. See LAW COMMISSION, CRIMINAL LAW: REPORT ON OFFENCES OF DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY, H.C. 91 (1970).
116. See CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, FOURTEENTH REPORT, OFFENCES
AGAINST THE PERSON, CMND. 7844 (1980).
117. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT 34
(1978).
118. See CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Table 7B
(1982).
119. See id.
120. See D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 65 (1979).
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it occasionally slips into judgments of the Court of Appeal. The objec-
tion to the use of this term is that for some it implies that the imposition
of a sentence of imprisonment is nothing more than the mechanical
application of a fixed scale, without the need for discretion or the con-
sideration of the individual cricumstances of the offender. In practice,
neither of these suggestions is generally true of the imposition of
sentences of imprisonment, and the term "tariff' is an unfortunate one.
The term conveys two ideas: (1) a set of conventions regulating the
relationship between particular classes of crime and corresponding
sentences, descending in some cases to a high level of detail; and (2) a
set of more general principles relating, for example, to the treatment of
multiple offences and personal mitigation. 12 1 The unifying concept is
that the application of the conventions and the general principles will
produce a sentence reflecting the culpability of the offender in relation
to the culpability of other offenders.
The origins of the tariff in the broad sense can be traced back at
least to the late nineteenth century. 122 They evolved as unwritten con-
ventions imparted to the newly appointed judge in informal conversa-
tions and consultations with his more experienced brethren. A more
formal tariff emerged in an attempt at the turn of the century to articu-
late an agreed set of conventions for sentence lengths, in a memoran-
dum which was to be circulated among judges. 123  Later, the
development of appellate review of sentences, in 1907, was expected to
provide a means of harmonising the use of imprisonment by sen-
tencer.124 The precise impact of these mechanisms is difficult to assess,
because until relatively recently the decisions of the Court of Appeal on
sentencing matters have been sparsely and unsystematically reported,
and have not been the subject of academic analysis. The maintenance
of sentence lengths at a particular level probably owes as much to the
older processes of informal consultation and instruction of junior
judges by their seniors as it does to the formal processes of appellate
review, although the appellate court clearly provides ceilings beyond
which sentence lengths will not go, and identifies the criteria which
serve to distinguish the graver from the less serious versions of the same
offence. The informal processes described by judges of the late nine-
121. See D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING, ch. 2, 4 (1979).
122. D.A. THOMAS, CONTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 61-66 (1979).
123. Id. at 70. The full text of the memorandum is set out in Appendix E of ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT, 191-96 app. E (1978).
124. See D.A. THOMAS, CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGMENT 77-91 (1979).
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teenth century 25 have long since been supplemented by formal sen-
tencing conferences for sentencers of varying levels of seniority, but the
decisions of the Court of Appeal play an important part in the exami-
nation of sentencing problems at these conferences. 26
A comparison of the sentences approved by the Court of Appeal
for a particular class of crime with the statistics of sentences imposed
for that class of crime in the Crown Court suggests that the Crown
Court is operating generally at a significantly lower level of sentence
than the Court of Appeal would allow. One reason for this disparity is
that there is no mechanism for the upward revision of sentences that in
the eyes of the Court of Appeal appear too lenient. 27
2. Young Adult Offenders.- Custodial Sentences - Since 1908 English
law has provided special forms of sentence for offenders in what has
come to be known as the young adult offender group. The age limits
for this group have varied from a minimum of fifteen to a maximum of
twenty-three; since 1961 the age range has been from fifteen to twenty-
one. These special sentencing provisions were designed in the first in-
stance to provide a therapeutic alternative to imprisonment for young
adult offenders considered likely to become recidivists. 28 Until 1961
imprisonment remained generally available, subject to a general legis-
lative requirement that a court should not impose imprisonment on an
offender in this age group unless there was no satisfactory alterna-
tive.' 29 The alternative form of sentence, known as borstal training, 130
was imposed without any term specified by the court. An offender sen-
tenced to borstal training would be required by statute to serve a mini-
mum of six months and a maximum of two years in custody in a borstal
institution, followed by a period on licence with the possibility of a
further period in custody if he were recalled.'' This sentence was
treated by the courts as a therapeutic measure which was not limited by
125. See Stephen, Variations in the Punishment of Crime, 2 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
75-93 (1885).
126. Personal experience of author.
127. See Thomas, Increasing Sentences on Appeal-a Re-Examination, 1972 CRIM. L.
REV. 288.
128. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS ch. 6
(1974).
129. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 17(2), now re-enacted as Powers of Criminal Courts
Act 1973, § 19(2).
130. The first such institution was located outside of Rochester, Kent, close to the village
of Borstal, from whence its name was derived. For an account of the development of borstal
training, see R.G. HOOD, BORSTAL REASSESSED (1965).
131. Prison Act, 1952, § 45(2), (4). Until 1961, the minimum was nine months and the
maximum was three years. See Criminal Justice Act 1961, sched. 6.
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the concept of just deserts and proportionality. The Court held that a
sentence of borstal training could be imposed for an offence for which
the maximum term of imprisonment was less than the minimum period
of detention under a sentence of borstal training, 32 and that a sentence
of borstal training could be imposed for an offence for which a sentence
of imprisonment would not have been imposed at all. 133
The use of borstal training by the courts was complicated by the
enactment in 1961 (effective in 1963) of legislation designed to en-
courage courts to use borstal training rather than imprisonment unless
the offence was so grave that a sentence of borstal training would fail to
reflect societal concern with the offence. 134 The effect of the legislation
was to raise the minimum age for imprisonment to seventeen (previ-
ously it was fifteen), and to prohibit a court from imposing a sentence
of imprisonment for any period between six months and three years.
Parliament's original intention was to phase out the shorter sentences
of imprisonment as detention centres for short-term custody of offend-
ers in this age group became available, but these centres were not built
on a sufficiently large scale for this intention to be realised. 35
The result of this legislation was that borstal training came to be
seen by the courts in two different lights: (1) as a therapeutic sentence,
imposed for the benefit of the offender, and therefore not subject to the
constraints of proportionality; and (2) as a punitive sentence imposed
as a deterrent on offenders who were not necessarily in need of training
but who had committed an offence of substantial gravity which (before
1963) would have attracted a sentence of between six months and three
years. 36 As a result of this duality in the role of borstal training, the
courts have applied two different sets of principles to the sentence, ac-
cording to the purpose for which it was imposed in the particular case.
A sentence which would be considered appropriate if imposed as a
treatment measure would be varied if the appellate court felt that it had
been imposed as a punitive measure, or vice versa.137 Declining confi-
dence in the idea of custodial treatment of offenders, reflected in disap-
pointing reconviction rates for discharged borstal trainees 138 has led to
132. R. v. Amos, 45 Cr. App. R. 42 (1960).
133. See R. v. Lee, I Cr. App. R. (S.) 361 (1979).
134. Criminal Justice Act, 1961, § 3.
135. For a discussion of the regime of detention centres, see ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE
PENAL SYSTEM, DETENTION CENTRES (1969).
136. See D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 262 (1979).
137. Compare R. v. English, 52 Cr. App. R. 119 (1967) with R. v. Coleman, 64 Cr. App.
R. 124 (1976).
138. Sixty-five per cent of trainees between 17 and 20 were reconvicted within two years
of discharge in 1978, compared with 69% of young prisoners discharged from prison
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a re-examination of the system of custodial sentences for young adult
offenders by the Advisory Council on the Penal System, who reported
in 1974.139
Legislation which will abolish borstal training and imprisonment
and replace them with a new form of sentence ("youth custody") has
now been enacted and is expected to become effective in 1983.14° The
form of the new sentence will resemble that of a sentence of imprison-
ment, except that there will be no power to suspend a sentence of youth
custody corresponding to the power to suspend a sentence of imprison-
ment. The sentence for the most part will be served in "youth custody
centres" (the old borstal institutions renamed).
3. Noncustodial Sentences - In the late nineteenth century, the idea
of a noncustodial sentence had not gained much of a foothold in the
English sentencing system. "I have wished often that some kind of
punishment could be invented for such offenders which, while making
them feel that crime cannot be committed with impunity, might save
them from the degradation of prison associations. That, I fear, is a
hopeless prospect," wrote E.W. Cox in his textbook on sentencing in
1877.1a i Fines were for the most part available only in cases of misde-
meanour, and the only means of dealing with a felon without imprison-
ment was to bind him over to come up for judgment - strictly
speaking a procedural device for postponing sentence. The use of this
procedure in conjunction with supervision by volunteers led to the cre-
ation of the probation order as a statutory measure to be imposed in-
stead of a sentence,' 42 which was followed, over a period of seventy
years, by the enactment of a number of procedures for dealing with
offenders without incarceration. 143 The development of noncustodial
measures, together with a series of changes in the law that made fines
available, instead of or in addition to imprisonment, for all other of-
fences except murder and treason, resulted in the majority of offenders
being dealt with without custody. l 4'
sentences. PRISON STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8654, Table 8 (e)
(1982).
139. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 21-27
(1974).
140. Criminal Justice Act, 1982.
141. E.W. Cox, PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT 44 (1877).
142. Probation of Offenders Act 1907.
143. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, NON-CUSTODIAL AND SEMI-CUS-
TODIAL PENALITES (1970).
144. In 1981, 22% of offenders convicted of indictable or either way offences received
custodial sentences. See CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668,
Figure 7.5 (1981).
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Despite the popularity of noncustodial measures, the law and
practice relating to them is not free from controversy or difficulty, and a
review of the major forms of measure is appropriate. Although almost
all forms of noncustodial measure derive from a single statute, the
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973,141 they were enacted in a series of
stages: in 1907,146 and 1948,' with further measures added in 1967148
and 1972,149 and the recently implemented provision for sentences held
partially in suspense in 1977.15° The appearance of coherence
presented by the consolidation of the relevant statutory provisions in
Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 conceals the fact that they reflect
ideas which were current at different times, and are therefore to some
extent in conflict with each other. Another result of the piecemeal de-
velopment of noncustodial measures are numerous minor legal differ-
ences which confuse the practitioner and the offender alike. 5' The
process by which new noncustodial measures have been added to the
statute book has been a haphazard one, reflecting a general optimism
that any new form of sentence can do little harm and may do some
good, but seldom attempting to resolve questions relating to the rela-
tionship of the new measure to those in existence already, or to identify
the underlying purpose and philosophy of the new measure. The result
is that several noncustodial measures have produced effects exactly op-
posite to those that were intended, and others have suffered seriously
from the lack of any agreed view of their proper scope and application.
a. Probation - Probation was the first statutory form of disposal
to recognise the concept of treatment. It developed out of the practice
of binding an offender in a recognizance to come up for judgment
when called (in other words, postponing sentence), on the basis that the
offender would accept the supervision of a volunteer social worker. It
was given a limited statutory recognition in 1887,152 and made avail-
able on a broader basis in 1907.153 The legislation was re-enacted in
1948 with minor amendments, 154 and then re-enacted again in the con-
solidating Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973.1'"
145. Powers of Criminal Courts Act (1973).
146. Probation of Offenders Act, 1907.
147. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, §§ 3-12.
148. Criminal Justice Act 1967, §§ 51-55.
149. Criminal Justice Act 1972, §§ 20-21.
150. Criminal Law Act 1977, § 47 (brought into effect in March 1982).
151. See generally 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 288 (discussion of the partly suspended sentence).
152. Probation of First Offenders Act, 1887.
153. Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, §§ 1-2.
154. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 31.
155. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, §§ 2-13.
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The court makes a probation order instead of sentencing the of-
fender, and no other sentence may be imposed for the same offence,
although the offender may be ordered to pay compensation 5 6 or may
be disqualified from driving.'57 For the period of the order (a mini-
mum of six months and a maximum of three years), the probationer is
under the supervision of the probation officer, and must comply with
any requirements that have been inserted in the order (and to which he
must express his consent). If he fails to comply with the order's re-
quirements, or commits a further offence, he may be brought before a
court and sentenced for the original offence as if he had just been con-
victed of it (the court has all its original powers and may make a fur-
ther probation order if it chooses to do so)."'8 Probation officers
exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether to take court ac-
tion against a probationer who fails to comply with the requirements of
the order.'59 If there is a further conviction, however, the decision to
initiate proceedings for the original offence will rest with the court. 16 0
For many years, probation was the predominant noncustodial
measure, but its use, in both relative and absolute terms, has dropped
considerably over the last ten years.' 6 ' A number of reasons are ad-
vanced for this decline: the growing number of alternative noncustodial
measures (including suspended sentences of imprisonment, available
since 1968, and community service orders, available generally since
1975), a decline in confidence in the idea of rehabilitation through su-
pervision (reflected in reconviction rates not significantly better than
those for custodial sentences), and the controversies within the proba-
tion service surrounding the identity and purpose of the service itself
(which have emerged in a number of disputes, some of which have
affected the work of the courts).
b. Suspended Sentences - Suspended sentences were introduced
in the Criminal Justice Act 1967, effective in 1968.162 The concept of a
suspended sentence is distinguished from probation in English law in a
156. Id. §§ 2(4), 35.
157. Road* Traffic Act, 1972, sched. 4.
158. See Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, ch. 62, §§ 6, 8. See also R. v. Havant
Justices, 41 Cr. App. R. 62 (1957).
159. See LAWSON, THE PROBATION OFFICER AS PROSECUTOR (1978).
160. See Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 8.
161. In 1969, 96,000 persons were subject to probation orders or analogous measures. By
1970, against the background of a substantial rise in the number of persons convicted, the
number of persons subject to such measures had declined to 62,000. See CRIMINAL STATIS-
TiCS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1979, CMND. 8098, paras. 6.9, 6.10 (1980).
162. Criminal Justice Act 1967, §§ 39-42. The current legislation is Powers of Criminal
Courts Act 1973, §§ 22-27.
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number of important respects. The law indicates that a suspended sen-
tence is to be treated in all respects as a sentence of imprisonment. The
measure should not be used unless the court would be prepared to im-
pose effective imprisonment in the absence of a power to suspend,' 63
and the Court of Appeal on many occasions has indicated that the fact
that a sentence is to be suspended does not mean that it may be any
longer than if it were to take effect immediately.'64 These restrictions
emphasize the fact that suspended sentences were introduced in the
hope that they would help to contain the growth of the prison popula-
tion. Many critics agree that they probably have had the opposite ef-
fect, or at least that whatever savings they have produced in one kind of
case have been offset by increases in the use of imprisonment in others
as a result of their availability.
65
The procedure of suspending a sentence of imprisonment requires
the sentencing court first to comply with all statutory rules and judicial
conventions governing the imposition of an effective sentence of im-
prisonment. In particular the court must consider and reject other
forms of sentence such as fines and probation. Having decided that
imprisonment is the appropriate sentence, it must then determine the
length of the sentence, considering all relevant factors, such as the grav-
ity of the offence and the mitigating factors that apply to the particular
offender. When this point has been reached, if the sentence is for less
than two years, the court may suspend the sentence for a period of
between twelve months and two years (the operational period).' 6 6 The
logical difficulty of complying with this set of principles is that if a sen-
tencing court complies properly with every stage in the process, it will
have exhausted all relevant considerations before the question of sus-
pension is reached. The court will then be forced either to take some
factors into account for a second time, or to invent some new criteria.
Despite these logical difficulties, the suspended sentence has be-
come a popular measure with both the Crown Court and magistrates'
courts. 16 7 The over-popularity of the suspended sentence has been one
163. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 22(2).
164. See the cases discussed in D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 240-41 (1979).
165. See Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England and Wales 1967-78, 21 BRIT. J. OF
CRIM. 1 (1981).
166. See Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, ch. 62, § 22(1).
167. In 1981 38,400 suspended sentences were imposed, 85% of which were of six months
or less. CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Table 7.21 (1982).
The statistics for the decade 1969 to 1979 show a decline in the use of the suspended
sentence, however, partly because from 1968-72 the suspension of sentences of less than six
months imprisonment was mandatory in a high proportion of cases, and partly because
sentencers have been frequently warned of the dangers of excessive use of suspended
sentences.
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of the reasons why it probably has failed to contribute to the contain-
ment of the prison population growth rate. There is a body of impres-
sionistic and anecdotal evidence which suggests that some courts,
contrary to the declared policy of the appellate court, have imposed
suspended sentences with terms longer than would have been imposed
if the sentences were to take effect immediately, and then, when the
offenders committed additional offences, imposed further immediate
terms of equivalent length and ordered the two terms to be served con-
secutively. 68 Consequently, an offender who, for example, might have
received two immediate terms of one month, with an interval between,
has eventually served two consecutive terms of six months for the same
offences. This problem has been aggravated by the tendency of some
courts to use suspended sentences where an immediate sentence would
not have been contemplated, despite the statutory rule against so doing.
The tendency of the suspended sentence to lead at least in some
cases to inflated sentences of imprisonment has been enhanced by the
strict enforcement policy laid down in the statute and reinforced by the
appellate court. The legislation provides that if an offender who is sub-
ject to a suspended sentence is convicted of a further offence punish-
able with imprisonment within the operational period, the original
sentence must be activated unless the court dealing with the matter
considers it unjust to do so having regard to matters arising since the
suspended sentence was imposed, in which case it may make a number
of alternative orders. 169 This statutory rule is backed up by a judicially
created rule stating that when an offender is ordered to serve a sus-
pended sentence, the sentence normally should be consecutive to any
sentence that is imposed for the later offence,' 70 subject to a reduction if
the result is an excessively long aggregate sentence.' 7'
c. Partly Suspended Sentences - A variation on the theme of the
suspended sentence is the partly suspended sentence. Legislation em-
powering courts to impose a sentence of imprisonment while requiring
the offender to serve only part of it with the rest held in suspense was
enacted in 1977,172 but did not come into effect until 1982.1'7 The stat-
ute allows a court which imposes a sentence of between six months and
168. See Bottoms, supra note 166, at 6-7.
169. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 23.
170. R. v. Ithell, 53 Cr. App. R. 210, 212 (1969).
171. R. v. Bocskei, 54 Cr. App. R. 519, 521 (1970).
About 10,500 (approximately 27%) of offenders receiving suspended sentences in
1981 subsequently became liable to serve the sentences. CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND
AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Table 7.29 (1982).
172. Criminal Law Act 1977, § 47, sched. 9.
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two years to require the offender to serve a portion of the sentence (be-
tween one quarter and three quarters), after which he may be released,
subject to the liability to serve the balance of the sentence if convicted
of a further offence during the whole term of the original sentence. The
idea of this measure is to allow a court to mark the gravity of an of-
fence, or to make a gesture of general deterrence with a substantial
sentence, while requiring the offender (probably a person who has not
previously been incarcerated) to serve only such period in prison as the
court considers sufficient to provide a personal deterrent to him. The
government expects this new measure to contribute to the relief of the
prison population by effectively shortening some sentences. Most com-
mentators, however, believe it probably will have exactly the opposite
effect, as judges will find it more attractive than the fully suspended
sentence, and will use it in cases where previously they would have
used a fully suspended sentence.
In addition to this difficulty, the new measure is extraordinarily
complicated to apply, particularly in light of the relationship between
partial suspension, parole, remission, and credit for time served prior to
trial.'74 The interaction of the various provisions, which clearly has not
been fully thought through by the proponents of this measure, is such
that cases can arise in which the offender would be better off with an
immediate sentence than with a partly suspended sentence of the same
nominal length,'75 and others in which an offender would be better off
with a partly suspended sentence than a fully suspended sentence of the
same nominal length.'76
Despite these doubts, the Parliment has recently enacted legisla-
tion that will make the partly suspended sentence more widely avail-
able, in particular to magistrates' courts. These provisions became
effective early in 1983.
d. Community Service - The community service order, widely
available since 1975, 17 is modelled in part on the probation order. It is
173. The provisions came into effect in March 1982. They have been amended by the
Criminal Justice Act 1982, with effect from January 1983.
174. For a discussion of these points see Thomas, The Partly Suspended Sentence, 1982
CRIM. L. REV. 288.
175. Id. at 291.
176. Id. at 292.
177. The Advisory Council on the Penal System suggested the use of community service
orders in 1970. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE PENAL SYSTEM, NON-CUSTODIAL AND SEMI-
CUSTODIAL PENALTIES (1970). The Criminal Justice Act 1972, §§ 15-19, authorized use of
community service orders on a limited experimental basis until 1975, when they became
available for use throughout the country. The current legislation is Powers of Criminal
Courts Act 1973, §§ 14-17.
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imposed in place of any other sentence for the offence concerned, and
in the event of a failure to comply with the order, or a subsequent con-
viction in the Crown Court, the order may be terminated and the of-
fender sentenced for the original offence. 178 The order requires the
offender to perform a specified number of hours of unpaid work, be-
tween 40 and 240, under the direction of the supervising officer (almost
always a probation officer). The nature of the work is determined by
the probation officer rather than the court (partly because of the diffi-
culties in finding suitable kinds of work without interfering with other
people's employment). The offender must consent to the order gener-
ally, but has no right to limit his consent to any particular form of
work.
Community service orders are administered by local probation
services, and their success in the eyes of sentencers depends to a large
extent on the ability of particular community service organisers to de-
velop convincing schemes and persuade the local judges and magis-
trates of their credibility. Nationally, community service orders (which
are restricted to persons aged seventeen or over) have made considera-
ble headway since becoming available generally.' 79 There is reason-
ably widespread agreement that community service was a desirable
innovation, but there is confusion and disagreement about its proper
purpose, the criteria which should govern its use by the courts, and the
terms in which it should be evaluated. 8 ° Is its function to provide an
acceptable punitive alternative to imprisonment, and if so, how is an
equation to be established between a period of community service mea-
sured in hours and a term of imprisonment measured in days? Or is
the primary purpose of the order therapeutic, so that it should be used
only if the offender is thought to be in need of treatment in this way? Is
the number of hours of service to be determined by the length of a
sentence of imprisonment, or by reference to the treatment needs of the
offender? These issues have not been clarified in pronouncements of
the Court of Appeal, which has rarely discussed the use of community
service, although recent decisions suggest that the Court is now pre-
pared to take a greater interest.' 8'
178. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, §§ 16-17.
179. In 1981, 28,000 community service orders were made. See CRIMINAL STATISTICS,
ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Table 7.1 (1981).
180. See W. YOUNG, COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS (1980).
181. See R. v. Lawrence, 4 Cr. App. R. (S.) 69 (1982).
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e. Deferment of Sentence - A further provision, introduced in
1972, is the deferment of sentence. 8 2 Strictly speaking, this is a proce-
dural step which allows a court to delay its determination of sentence
for up to six months, with the consent of the offender. The power to
defer sentence is in addition to the court's normal power to adjourn for
inquiries, which would not normally be for more than twenty-eight
days. The procedure for deferment of sentence on the whole has
proved superfluous and a frequent source of confusion, particularly
when the offender appears before a different judge or bench of magis-
trates from the one that deferred sentence. 8
3
The purpose of the deferment is to allow the court to consider the
offender's behaviour in the interval, but there is no provision for formal
supervision of the offender or the recording of specific requirements.
Although the Court of Appeal has stated that a sentencer deferring sen-
tence should record his reason for doing so - for the benefit of the
sentencer who eventually deals with the offender 84 - research shows
that this is frequently neglected. 85 It is not uncommon to find a case in
which one judge has deferred the sentence of an offender, who then
tried for six months to satisfy the expectations of the first judge, only to
return to court before a different judge who takes the view that the
offender should have been sentenced to imprisonment in the first in-
stance, and imposes a custodial sentence. Although the Court of Ap-
peal has now established that this should not be done, 86 and that the
deferment of a sentence in effect constitutes a bargain with the offender
that if he complies with the expectations of the sentencer, he will not be
committed to custody when he appears, the procedure is still unsatis-
factory and unnecessary.
4. Fines and Financial Measures - Fines have been part of the sen-
tencing system for many years, but they did not become widely avail-
able in felony cases until the present century, and the removal of
restrictions on the use of fines was not completed until 1948.'87 In
more recent years, they have been joined by a number of other orders
182. The current legislation is Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 1.
183. The heavy reliance on part-time recorders and deputy circuit judges in the Crown
Court, and the use of lay magistrates in the Magistrates Court means that this is a frequent
occurrence. See Corden & Nott, The Power to Defer Sentence, 20 BRIT. J. CRIM. 358, 364-66
(1980).
184. See cases cited in D.A. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 383 (1979).
185. See Corden & Nott, supra note 183, at 364.
186. See R. v. Gilby, 61 Cr. App. R. 112 (1975); R. v. Glossop, Cr. App. R. (S.) 347
(1981).
187. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, § 13.
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concerned with financial or property aspects, some punitive, some pre-
ventive, and some directed toward compensation. For the most part,
these measures are ancillary and may be imposed only in conjunction
with some other form of sentence (except the fine, which normally can
stand either alone or in conjunction with almost any other penalty).'
As in the case of noncustodial measures, they have been added to the
statute book without much obvious regard to their relationship to other
measures, and have in many cases produced difficulties which were not
anticipated by their promoters.
a. Fines - Fines have been available for all offences other than
treason or murder since 1948, either as the sole penalty or in addition to
any other measure that is not in lieu of a sentence (such as a probation
order). The Crown Court is not subject to any maximum limit as to
amount; 8 9 the magistrates' courts are in most cases subject to a maxi-
mum of £1,000 for offences triable either way, 190 but there is specific
provision for larger fines in certain cases (such as regulatory offences
liable to be committed by corporations). The maximum fines for sum-
mary offences are stipulated in the provision creating the offence.' 9' In
imposing a fine, courts in most cases must grant time for payment and
may order payment by installments. There are restrictions on the com-
mittal to prison of offenders for inability to pay fines, but the power to
commit for nonpayment is available as a last resort if the court is satis-
fied that there has been wilful fault or neglect. 192 Other methods of
enforcement of fines - distress and garnishment orders in particular -
are available, but not widely used. Fines are by far the most frequently
used penal measure.193
The major problem affecting the use of fines is their differential
impact on offenders of differing financial standing. The statutory pro-
visions governing the imposition of fines by magistrates' courts require
a court before imposing a fine to have regard to the means of the of-
188. The Criminal Justice Act 1982, contains provisions which will allow a compensation
order to be imposed as a sentence in its own right, but these provisions are not yet in force.
189. Criminal Law Act 1977, § 32(1).
190. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, § 32(9).
19 1. The Criminal Justice Act, 1982, § 37 establishes a new scheme of maximum fines for
summary offences.
192. See Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, § 76(!). Approximately 20,000 male fine default-
ers were received into prison in 1981, although most were committed for short periods: 75%
of males committed in default were committed for periods of not more than one month.
About 1,000 defaulters were in prison on any one day. See PRISON STATISTICS, ENGLAND
AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8654, Tables 7(b), 7(c), 7(d) (1982).
193. Forty-five percent of all indictable offences resulted in a fine in 1981. CRIMINAL
STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668, Figure 7.5 (1982).
1983]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fender. 9 4  Although there is no equivalent statutory provision gov-
erning the Crown Court, the Court of Appeal has stated many times
that a fine should not be imposed unless the court is satisfied that the
offender has the means to pay the fine, if necessary by installments,
within a period not exceeding twelve months (except in unusual
cases)."' The Court of Appeal has now established that it is a wrong
exercise of discretion to impose a fine at a level above that which is
customary for the offence in question because the offender is of above
average financial means, 96 although it is clearly accepted that the
amount may be reduced where the offender does not have the means to
pay the usual amount.197 There are considerable difficulties in dealing
with unemployed persons who come before the courts for offences that
normally would attract a fine, but the Court has not yet given adequate
guidance to lower tribunals on how to deal with this problem. 98
Because relatively few cases involving fines are the subject of ap-
peals to the Court of Appeal, there are no tariffs or judicially approved
conventions for determining the amount of fines in relation to particu-
lar types of offences. Their place is taken, so far as motoring offences
are concerned, by a series of guidelines issued by the Magistrates' Asso-
ciation, an independent body to which most lay magistrates belong. 199
These guidelines have no legal standing (although they have recently
received a qualified judicial recognition),2" and they are intended to
provide starting points rather than a complete system of prescribed
penalties. They are subject to adaptation in various localities in re-
sponse to particular local problems.
A second problem affecting the use of fines is that of their effective
enforcement. No data exists to show how many fines are eventually
paid by the offenders on whom they are imposed, but many courts have
very large outstanding amounts. The number of persons committed in
default is not an accurate indication of the extent of default, because
many defaulting offenders will escape commitment for one reason or
another.
194. Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, § 35.
195. See R. v. Rizvi, I Cr. App. R. (S.) 307 (1979).
196. R. v. Fairbairn, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 315 (1980).
197. See, e.g., R v. Wright, 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 82 (1980).
198. For one recent case dealing with this problem, see R. v. Ball, 3 Cr. App. R. (S.) 283
(1981).
199. The guidelines are published in their current form in Note, Suggestionsfor Court's
Assessmentfor Main Traffic Offences, 146 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 128 (1982).
200. See R. v. Simpson, 3 Cr. App. R. (S.) 148 (1981).
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b. Compensation - Provision for compensation to be paid by the
offender to the victim has been part of the law since 1870, but in prac-
tice compensation orders have been used widely only since the intro-
duction in 1972 of a general power to order compensation.2"'
Compensation orders should be distinguished from the expression "res-
titution order," which in English law relates to an order for the return
of stolen property, or other property into which the stolen property has
been converted, rather than compensation in a more general sense.2 °2
The provisions which allow a criminal court to order a convicted per-
son to pay compensation to a person who has suffered loss, damage, or
injury as a result of his offence also should be distinguished from the
system of publicly financed compensation to victims of crimes of vio-
lence (whether or not the offender is detected or convicted) through the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.20 3
The current legislation empowers a criminal court, in addition to
dealing with the offender in another way, to order him to pay compen-
sation for any loss, damage, or injury suffered by the victim as a result
of the offence. Magistrates' courts are limited to a maximum limit of
£1,000 per offence and all courts must consider the means of the of-
fender before making a compensation order.2° The Court of Appeal
has interpreted this requirement to mean that the court must be satis-
fied that the offender has or will have the resources to discharge the
order within a period of about two years.20 5 Compensation may be
ordered to be paid by installments, and the powers of enforcement in-
elude the power to commit the defaulter to prison.2 °6
Although compensation orders have proved popular with
sentencers in the magistrates' courts and the Crown Court, they have
produced a considerable number of disadvantages which outweigh
their value, and which appear to be inherent in any scheme to order
offenders to compensate victims. As a system of compensating victims
of crime generally, the present scheme is hopelessly deficient. Any sys-
tem that relies on the detection and conviction of the offender, and pay-
ment by him out of his resources while undergoing a penal measure
whether in or out of custody, is bound to leave very large numbers of
201. The current provision is Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 35.
202. The statute authorizing restitution orders is the Theft Act 1968, § 28.
203. For an account of the working of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, see
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, SIXTEENTH REPORT, CMND. 8081 (1980).
204. Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, § 35(4).
205. See, e.g., R. v. Bradburn, 57 Cr. App. R. 948 (1973). (Court allows limited compen-
sation order despite defendant's lack of means where defendant is physically healthy and
capable of earning some income).
206. See Administration of Justice Act 1970, sched. 9 (part 1).
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victims uncompensated. Either the criminal justice system will fail to
detect or to convict the offender, the offender generally will lack means,
or his sentence will be incompatible with the payment of compensation
out of income. The English system is no exception - although victims
of crimes of violence are reasonably well-provided for out of public
funds (provided their injuries attract more than the minimum amount
of compensation, which is currently £400) - other victims do not do
well out of the system of court-ordered compensation. In 1981, com-
pensation orders were made in only about six percent of all burglary
cases.20 7 How many of these compensation orders were fully paid is
not known, because there is no systematic published data on default on
compensation orders. One research study found, however, that fifty-
four percent of orders for the payment of more than fifty pounds were
not paid within eighteen months of the order.2"8 Even if there is no
default, the majority of compensation orders are paid by installments
over a period of twelve months or two years, and can be of little value
to those victims whose need of compensation is immediate.
The power to order compensation can be a source of considerable
disparity between offenders. Many courts, particularly magistrates'
courts, find themselves in difficulties when faced with an offender who
normally ought to be sentenced to imprisonment, but who informs the
court that he will be in a position to pay compensation if he is left at
liberty. Often the court will decide to take the course suggested, and
will impose a noncustodial sentence coupled with a compensation or-
der, with the result that the more affluent offender - or the offender
who appears to be more affluent - is able to buy his way out of prison,
often without actually paying. (There is no power to make a noncus-
todial sentence conditional on payment of the compensation ordered
by the court.) The offender who is unable to convince the court of his
ability to pay compensation will have a justifiable sense of grievance if
he is sent to prison for a similar offence. The worst abuse of the com-
pensation order system is where the offender, usually in the Crown
Court, presents himself as having the means to pay compensation, and
persuades the sentencing court to make a compensation order coupled
with a noncustodial sentence, usually a suspended sentence. He then
appeals against the compensation order, alleging that his financial cir-
cumstances have changed, or that the evidence put before the Crown
Court was mistaken. The appeal court normally will be compelled to
quash the compensation order, but cannot interfere with the suspended
207. CRIMINAL STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES 1981, CMND. 8668 (1982).
208. P. SOFTLEY, COMPENSATION ORDERS IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS (Home Office Re-
search Study No. 43, 1978).
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sentence which was imposed on the assumption that compensation
would be paid. Consequently, the offender escapes all effective penal
consequences and the victim receives nothing.
5. Other Ancillary Measures - English law provides a further group
of ancillary measures, most of which were introduced in 1972.29 They
include the power to deprive an offender of his rights in any property
that has been used to facilitate the commission of a crime,2t ° the power
to disqualify from driving an offender who has used a motor vehicle in
the commission of a crime,2 ' ' and the power to make a criminal bank-
rupt if his combined offences have resulted in losses to the victims of
£15,000 or more.21 2 These measures have been affected by a number of
difficulties that were not in the minds of the legislators who enacted
them. In part the problems arise from the way the relevant statutory
provisions were drafted, and these problems could be cured by amend-
ment of the law, but others are more deeply rooted. The problem that
affects most of these measures is whether they are to be considered part
of the normal penalty for the offence, or an addition to it. There is a
real possibility of their being used in combination to produce a total
imposition that is gravely disproportionate to the offence. A further
difficulty is whether the court should make an order - particularly of
disqualification from driving in a case where the offence was not a traf-
fic offence - that will limit the offender's employment opportunities on
his release from prison. The Court of Appeal has been reluctant to
uphold disqualifications that will last beyond the date of the offender's
release from prison, and thus limit his employment potential, even
though it is clearly an express object of the statutory provision to dis-
qualify such offenders.213
III. APPRAISAL
For the last two decades, English penal policy has been dominated
by a single theme: the need to control the growth of the prison popula-
tion. Continuous increases in the volume of crime recorded by the po-
lice, and in the number of persons arraigned before the courts, have led
to a significant growth in the average population of penal institutions
(although the growth in the penal population has not been so great as
209. Criminal Justice Act 1972, §§ 22-24.
210. See Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1972, § 43.
211. Id. § 44.
212. Id. § 39.
213. See R. v. Wright, I Cr. App. R. (S.) 82 (1979). (Court of Appeal quashed sentence of
disqualification from driving where the offender was a taxi driver).
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the growth in the number of persons indicted). This problem had led
to the enactment of a succession of new kinds of measures, each of
which has been thought to be the means of solving the problem, or at
least gaining a temporary respite. As at other critical periods of penal
history, there has been no overall strategy; one expedient has followed
another, without any obvious consideration of the relationship of the
new element to the whole. The latest penal legislation, the Criminal
Justice Act 1982, follows this pattern. The result has been the develop-
ment of an extensive range of different penal measures, which may
seem impressive when considered in the abstract, but which are not
significantly different from each other in practice. The imposition of
one as opposed to the other does not necessarily make any immediate
difference to the offender. Part of the price of this legislative activity
has been the erosion of some of the judicially evolved principles, as
Parliament has seldom troubled to make any assessment of the extent
to which the new development will mesh with existing judicial sentenc-
ing conventions. Recent statutory developments (such as the reduction
of the minimum period that must be served before a prisoner can be-
come eligible for parole) seem certain to cut across judicial initiatives to
reduce sentence lengths.
Of particular interest to American observers is the tariff and the
mechanisms by which it is maintained, particularly appellate review.
The English system of appellate review has been one of the strongest
and most valuable features of her criminal justice system over the last
thirty years, despite the limitations under which the system has
laboured - in particular inadequate reporting and the paucity of aca-
demic interest. At present, the Court of Appeal is passing through a
difficult phase and many of its current decisions are open to serious
criticism. There can be no question that the institution is sound and
has provided a better mechanism for structuring sentencing discretion
than has legislation. If appellate review of sentences can work effec-
tively in England and Wales, which is a larger jurisdictional unit than
any individual American state, there is every reason to suppose it could
work effectively in the American context.
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